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The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) was inaugurated 
in May 1996. It was formed in response to the need for an Academy 
of Science consonant with the dawn of democracy in South Africa: 
activist in its mission of using science and scholarship for the benefit 
of society, with a mandate encompassing all scholarly disciplines 
that use an open-minded and evidence-based approach to build 
knowledge. ASSAf thus adopted in its name the term ‘science’ in 
the singular as reflecting a common way of enquiring rather than an 
aggregation of different disciplines. Its Members are elected on the 
basis of a combination of two principal criteria, academic excellence 
and significant contributions to society.  
The Parliament of South Africa passed the Academy of Science of 
South Africa Act (Act 67 of 2001), and the Act came into force on 
15 May 2002. This made ASSAf the only academy of science in South 
Africa recognised by government and representing the country in the 
international community of science academies and elsewhere.
This report reflects the proceedings of the symposium on Our Nuclear 
Future: Delay or Demise? hosted by the Academy of Science of South 
Africa on 15 April 2014 at the Innovation Hub in Pretoria.
Views expressed are those of the individuals and not necessarily those 
of the Academy nor a consensus view of the Academy based on an 
in-depth evidence-based study.
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SESSION ONE: 
ENERGY PLANNING AND NUCLEAR
ENERGY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(CHAIR: PROF ROB ADAM, AVENG GROUP)
Opening and Welcome Remarks 
(Prof Daya Reddy, ASSAf)
Prof Reddy welcomed everyone to the symposium. 
While there was much to be debated in the context of South Africa’s 
energy policy, the nuclear aspects of those policies were amongst 
the most contentious and were argued in committees and among 
policymakers, academics, researchers, advisors, and in the press and 
the media. Relevant South African policies and plans included the 
National Development Plan (NDP) and the government’s Integrated 
Resource Plan (IRP) for electricity. What was needed was a current 
and comprehensive view in a highly dynamic context and situation, 
together with policy and other means to make firm decisions and to 
act on those decisions. 
ASSAf had a role to play in informing the processes that would lead 
to such decision-making and policy development. The Academy was 
recognised through an Act of Parliament as the official science acad-
emy of the country. Its Members constitute an independent body of 
top scholars from the natural and the human sciences. The Academy 
is committed to mobilising the best intellects, expertise and experience 
in the country in order to provide and work towards evidence-based 
solutions to national and regional problems. It has no vested interests 
and relies on the willingness of its Members and other experts whom it 
calls upon to provide their services on an entirely voluntary basis. AS-
SAf’s multi-disciplinary nature and its work are characterised by scien-
tifically rigorous analyses of evidence in the best traditions of science. 
As part of the Academy’s brief to promote science awareness and 
science literacy, it has an important role in helping to ensure that the 
general public is well informed on issues such as those to be discussed 
during this symposium. 
Our Nuclear Future Delay or Demise?
5
Among the projects and activities that have been undertaken by the 
Academy in the past years, a number were closely related to the topic 
of this symposium. In 2011, ASSAf hosted a symposium on nuclear safety, 
followed by the publication of a proceedings report and a statement 
on nuclear safety, which were widely disseminated. ASSAf carried out 
a detailed commentary on the IRP 2010 and, after a meeting of African 
science academies on improving energy access in sub-Saharan Africa, 
produced a policymakers’ booklet that was translated into French and 
widely disseminated. 
The purpose of organising this symposium was to bring together a 
diverse range of views and invite engagement in a rigorous, evidence-
based, scholarly debate on the issue of nuclear energy. This topic has 
lent itself to serious analysis, but required even more analysis on what 
should be happening in this country. Panellists, chairs and presenters 
are from a range of backgrounds: academia, government, private 
and public sectors, and civil society. This would be the first occasion 
for some of the participants to debate these issues on the same forum. 
South Africa is not alone in the world in grappling with the issues related 
to nuclear energy. The international perspective on nuclear energy 
would be provided by Prof Thomas Kåberger from Sweden. 
Integrated Resource Plan Context and Update 
(Mr Keith Bowen, Eskom)
The IRP 2010 was a blueprint of the types of generating capacity 
that would be required in South Africa over the next few decades. 
The original IRP 2010 was a widely consulted document, which had 
come through a very broad process with inputs from various elements 
of society and expertise. The Department of Energy (DoE) and the 
Cabinet had reached consensus about the energy mix. The IRP 2010 
proposed a radical departure from an almost entirely coal-based 
generating fleet and introduced renewables, more nuclear and more 
gas while allowing a place for coal, and set the scene for a very strong 
change in the country’s generating capacity. Changing circumstances 
(such as new energy finds and political developments) necessitated 
a process to update the IRP. In updating the IRP, the DoE had run a 
consultative process, which had drawn comments from a wide range 
of stakeholders. 
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Aspects of the IRP had led to uncertainty in a number of underlying as-
sumptions. The IRP update proposed a series of decision trees instead of 
a plan in order to provide information that would assist decision-makers 
in determining the direction to be taken. The most significant change 
that resulted from the consultation process and policy-adjusted IRP 
was the increase in renewables, predominantly due to photovoltaic 
(PV) generation. However, a significant drop in the electricity demand 
was evident over the previous five years relative to the IRP 2010 expect-
ed energy consumption despite the fact that the economy had re-
covered from the 2009 financial crisis and had grown as expected. An 
analysis of the situation revealed that pricing of electricity had played 
an important role in constraining the electricity demand and keeping 
it at the same level as economic growth into the future, even though 
supply could not match demand. Changing dynamics caused by 
higher electricity prices could mean that prices would not revert to the 
2005 level when the electricity demand grew in tandem with econom-
ic growth. More analysis would be required to determine the demand 
trajectory over the next 20 years, an important factor in order to assess 
technology requirements.   
 
The capital cost assumptions used for different technologies showed 
that the capital costs of nuclear had grown relative to the IRP 2010 in 
real terms. The capital costs of concentrated solar power (CSP) had 
also increased, mainly because of a deteriorating exchange rate, while 
there had been a relative decrease in the capital costs of PV and wind 
in real terms. One of the biggest divergences of opinion was around 
future nuclear costs. The IRP 2010 used the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) costs of US$ 5 300/kW. Feedback from many players 
in the public participation process, including Eskom, indicated that 
the costs of nuclear would be much higher than originally assumed. 
Technology choices were dependent on capital costs.
A series of scenarios was considered in relation to demand projections 
up to 2050. The NDP presented the idea that in order to alleviate 
poverty and reduce unemployment it would be necessary for the gross 
domestic product (GDP) to grow by 5.4% on average over the next 
20 years. The IRP update translates this into a 2.8% average growth in 
electricity demand. 
The role of nuclear as a baseload provider was considered in relation 
to other baseload technology choices. Nuclear potentially competed 
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with technologies such as gas, coal and coal with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) that could be dispatched as and when required. 
The decision trees indicated the best technology option under different 
scenarios and highlighted the fact that low demand growth would 
not require nuclear build until 2035, while higher growth would require 
nuclear build earlier. Nuclear was less preferred to other technologies if 
the cost was above US$ 6 500/kW. Coal options include life extension of 
the existing fleet, building a large pulverised fuel coal plant in 2029 and 
building small-scale fluidised-bed combustion coal units. 
 
Costs, Financing, Timing and Risk Management of 
Nuclear Power 
(Prof Harald Winkler, Director, Energy Research Centre 
(ERC), University of Cape Town (UCT))
The emphasis in this presentation was on the general issues, such as 
costs, financing, timing and risks, which should be addressed by any 
energy technology. 
The general issues to be taken into account in the case of nuclear are:
• Costs and financial viability
• Localisation
• Potential developmental benefits
• Environmental costs and benefits
• Transparent policy, plans, procurement and governance
• The planning context with multiple objectives
Specific issues that have to be taken in account in relation to nuclear 
are: 
• Safety
• Storage of high-level radioactive waste
• Siting
The ERC has found the updated IRP to be good technically and the 
approach of decision-making under uncertainty, rather than a single 
‘preferred plan’, to be sensible. The IRP update effectively indicated 
that a decision about nuclear would be required only ten years before 
the highest demand scenario in 2025.
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The ERC had done modelling and published a report Towards a New 
Power Plan on behalf of the National Planning Commission (NPC). The 
ERC did not propose a new plan but provided information to inform 
the update of the IRP, with a focus on energy supply alternatives. The 
study focused on questions on the supply-side, and did not include an 
update of detailed bottom-up demand projections. Based on recent 
events (e.g. global financial crisis), it was assumed that demand would 
be significantly lower in 2030 than previously expected, as did the 
IRP update. In terms of the timing of nuclear power, given demand 
projections and different capital costs, the partial optimisation model 
indicated that nuclear would be required only from 2040 with lower 
demand projections and at US$ 7 000/kW upfront capital costs. New 
nuclear would be required from 2029 if demand proved to be higher, 
and if investment costs were US$ 5 000/kW or lower. 
Flexibility of options was important in the frame in which decision-
making was approached, as well as in terms of the lead times and 
increments as there were risks of over-build and under-build. The ERC 
study assumed the same net real post-tax discount rate of 8% as the 
IRP update. A review by Schneider et al. (2013) of the nuclear industry 
globally found that the average construction time of a nuclear unit 
was 9.4 years. This figure was used by the ERC.
The levelised cost of energy (LCOE) was an important metric and was 
a handy tool for comparing the unit costs of different technologies over 
their economic life. It incorporated capital costs (capex), and operating 
and maintenance costs (opex) over different lifetimes. The cost structure 
of the different technology options had to be understood. Coal had 
lower capex and high opex, nuclear had high capex and lower opex 
– the latter being a similar cost structure to renewables, which have 
no fuel costs and thus can have even lower opex. Good practice was 
to test the sensitivity of cost results with different discount rates. Results 
from the ERC study in relation to levelised costs showed that imported 
hydro was very attractive while coal was the domestic technology with 
the lowest LCOE at high capacity factors (if CO2 considerations were 
not taken into account). Gas was competitive with nuclear depending 
on the cost assumptions for nuclear (US$ 5 000/kW or US$ 7 000/kW) and 
on capacity factors. The range for solar thermal plants with assumed 
14-hour storage was very close to the nuclear range.
Financing nuclear was an important factor. Public domain cost esti-
mates of a nuclear fleet for South Africa, ranged from R322 to R1 044 
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billion and that scale raised questions about financing the programme, 
particularly in the context of:
• the R225 billion shortfall for Eskom’s current build programme; 
• government’s provision of R350 billion debt guarantee, impacting 
on the debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio; 
• the cost of servicing public debt (R115 billion per year), which 
leaves very little room for further guarantees; 
• whether further capex for Eskom would come from debt from 
capital markets raised against its balance sheet, or from export 
credit agencies or Russian finance, and what the element of risk 
would be; 
• the timing of the decisions concerning nuclear and changes in 
costs over time. 
Improving energy governance is a key goal of all energy policy, as 
outlined in our Energy Policy White Paper of 1998. There were ques-
tions about transparency in relation to nuclear policy, governance, risk 
management and the procurement process, and about public infor-
mation. The history of nuclear power has been secretive globally, given 
its origins in the military-industrial complex. The way the nuclear policy 
came about in this country has differed to that of other energy poli-
cies. In 2008, when Nuclear 1 was to be built, procurement was run as 
an internal programme by Eskom. Questions were also raised about 
whether decisions about nuclear would be based on good technical 
analysis and evidence-based policymaking, or on geo-political con-
siderations. Given the specific risks of nuclear power, processes should 
be as, if not more, transparent as any other energy policy, planning or 
procurement process.
Risk management considerations of nuclear included:
• The expense of over and under-build of power plants to the South 
African economy and society. Both over and under-investment 
have very large costs on the economy and society.  
• Managing the risk of large ‘lumpy investments’. Building 9 600 MW 
was a risky proposition that had upside risks of delays, as well as 
downside risks of over-build. The approach to making decisions 
under uncertainty (decision trees) made much sense. 
• The building of power generation with smaller unit size had 
advantages, ameliorating the risk of large plants being built as a 
nuclear ‘fleet’. 
Our Nuclear Future Delay or Demise?
10
Perspective on IRP Update 
(Facilitated Panel Discussion)
 
The following questions were posed to the panel:
1) Are predictions of lower growth rates in line with the aspirations 
for national economy growth or merely self-fulfilling and therefore 
potentially dangerous?
2) Can South Africa meet its CO2 emission targets based on the 
updated IRP 2010?
3) The outer years of the IRP (2050) see a South African energy 
landscape where nuclear and renewables might feature very 
strongly. What, if anything, is likely to disrupt this?
Mr Dennis Britz 
(Arcelor Mittal, Energy Intensive User Group of Southern 
Africa)
The challenge in developing the IRP in South Africa had to do with 
forecasting and planning within the context of high uncertainty, as well 
as the historical reliance on coal power. Globally, there were significant 
changes in the type, origin and availability of primary energy supplies, 
energy carriers and technologies, as well as new policy environments 
in terms of energy efficiency, energy resources and climate change 
mitigation. Although these changes offered much opportunity they 
also caused uncertainty and therefore risk. Industry, especially energy 
intensive industry, required assurance in terms of:
• Price: Mining, minerals and manufacturing industries were 
particularly price sensitive due to their energy intensity and 
they needed internationally competitive-priced electricity and 
predictable pricing.
• Security of supply: Supply of electricity had to be reliable and 
sufficient. Expansion of least cost options of supply had to be in line 
with national resource planning. 
• Technology and mix: Industry had to benefit from all the 
technologies, the right mix of energy and the natural resources in 
the region.
All energy types, including nuclear, had a role to play in industry. 
Timing was critical in order to avoid over-commitment, over-build and 
under-build. It was necessary to have a plan to build, and to build to 
Our Nuclear Future Delay or Demise?
11
that plan. The high cost of nuclear per kW installed and the lengthy 
construction periods associated with nuclear plants presented specific 
risks to developing countries, particularly in uncertain economic times. 
Mr Britz responded as follows to the questions posed to the panel:
1) The GDP energy intensity would keep on reducing due to the 
increasing price of energy in South Africa and the drive in terms of 
climate change. 
2) There was a fine balance between affordability in terms of price 
and absolute CO2 targets. If the price was too high there would be 
no buyers of electricity and the demand would decrease. 
3) Factors that could disrupt the 2050 South African energy 
landscape included the world’s view in relation to climate change, 
natural gas developments in South Africa, and experiences of 
renewables. 
Mr Saliem Fakir 
(World Wildlife Foundation (WWF))
It was important to explore certain critical questions of relevance 
to the nature of the energy mix from the WWF’s perspective. These 
questions concerned predictions of the economy over the next ten 
to 15 years and whether the NDP’s projection of 5.4% growth in GDP 
would be realisable in the next ten years given the global recession 
and decreasing growth rates in China and other economies. The level 
of certainty around the growth rate influenced the demand. Even if 
demand grew, the level of energy required would not necessarily be 
at a higher level than predicted in the IRP 2010. There was uncertainty 
about whether there would be more growth in the energy intensive 
sectors, particularly given increases in electricity prices and challenges 
relating to the competitiveness of the sectors. Perhaps the economy 
would change to include more service, and other less energy intensive, 
sectors. 
WWF’s questions about nuclear concerned the following:
• Linking overnight costs to the actual costs of building a nuclear 
plant, including the potential for cost overruns.
• The levelised cost of running a nuclear plant compared to other 
technologies, such as gas or renewables. 
• The economics of managing spent fuel, decommissioning of plants 
and dealing with long-term radioactive waste.
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• Liability issues around the cost of the plant and safety issues.
• Uncertainty about economic growth and the need for flexibility 
of technology options, how to solve the energy problem in the 
interim, as well as in the long term taking into account evolving 
technologies, including storage technology.
• The distinction between the economic discount rate and the 
financial discount rate, and an appropriate choice of discount 
rates for nuclear and other energy technologies. 
Mr Andrew Kenny 
(Environmentalist and Consulting Engineer)
The gifts of nature must be used respectfully and wisely, and must work 
in harmony with nature. In the context of energy, wind and solar should 
be used for small, off-grid applications and nuclear should be used for 
baseload electricity. 
Nuclear was by far the safest source of energy, had the smallest 
environmental disruption and the least waste. All energy technologies 
produced waste that lasted for millions of years, while only nuclear had 
proper procedures for the safe storage of its waste. Nuclear power 
was always economically competitive and often the cheapest and 
the most reliable source of energy. Nuclear plants could be situated 
wherever required. Nuclear accident risks were far lower than the risks 
of other energy sources. Fukushima was a recent demonstration of 
nuclear safety, particularly as nobody was, or was likely to be, killed or 
harmed by the radiation. 
The following flaws were identified in the IRP update:
• 1 MW of capacity from wind was treated the same as 1 MW from 
nuclear, whereas 1 MW of nuclear produced twelve times as 
much electricity as 1 MW of wind.
• 1 kWh of wind power was treated the same as a kWh of nuclear 
power.  This was untrue because of the intermittency of wind.
• The high price of nuclear was incorrect.
• The load factors of 30% for wind and 19.4% for solar PV were 
inflated.
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• The fundamental fact about CO2 reduction was not recognised.  
1 kWh of nuclear displaces 1 kWh of fossil generation and 1 kWh of 
wind or solar did not displace 1 kWh of fossil generation. 
• The projection of a lower electricity demand in the future was 
incorrect.
The IRP should be re-written to take into account the lessons learnt from 
Germany’s green experiment. In 2011, after nuclear safety had been 
demonstrated at Fukushima, Germany decided to phase out nuclear 
power, which had been that country’s safest and cheapest source 
of electricity, and to replace it with wind and solar. The result of this 
decision was:
• soaring electricity prices, now almost the highest in Europe, 
responsible for shutting down or relocation of industries; 
• unstable electricity with a huge increase in power failures, grid 
fluctuations, stoppages and damage;
• environmental blight and pollution;
• increased CO2 emissions.
The rich elite has been the only beneficiary of this green revolution. 
The electricity companies were forced to buy wind and solar electricity 
at very high prices whether or not it was needed. This represented 
enormous subsidies to wind and solar power, which deprived the poor 
as finances were transferred to pay rich developers of wind and solar 
power plants. Germany spent vast amounts of money on thousands 
of gigantic wind turbines and huge arrays of PV panels. Wind and 
solar power have been shown to be unreliable and unpredictable. For 
example, on a certain day in 2013, German wind with a capacity of 
32 500 MW produced only 120 MW with a load factor of 0.4%. Other 
generators, notably gas turbines, were obliged to ramp up and down 
to compensate for the unpredictability, running inefficiently, using more 
fuel per kWh and emitting more CO2. 
Wind turbines were a massive and a wasteful, inefficient use of earth’s 
resources. They used ten times more concrete and steel per kWh than 
nuclear plants and caused suffering to people living in proximity, as 
well as severe environmental problems. Wind power for grid electricity 
was extremely expensive and completely dependent on subsidies en-
forced by governments, hopelessly unreliable and had extremely low 
capacity factors. 
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In South Africa solar was much more productive than wind, but was 
not a viable option for grid electricity or baseload electricity, except 
concentrated solar power (CSP) with storage, which could be used for 
peaking power. 
According to examples of recent contracts for nuclear, capital costs of 
US$ 4 000/kW were reasonable. China and South Korea were building 
nuclear plants within those countries at under US$ 2 000/kW. Actual 
production costs in the US were currently at US$ 0.024/kWh and the real 
rate of return was reasonable at 3%, lower than the current Eskom bond 
yield. These costs would provide nuclear electricity at a commercial 
price of US$ 0.070 / kWh.        
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) figures reflecting electricity consump-
tion in South Africa between 1993 and 2013 showed that consumption 
peaked in 2007/2008 followed by a slump in demand. This ‘peak’ was 
not due a sudden change in the economy but was caused by Eskom’s 
inability to meet the growing energy demand, which resulted in load 
shedding, energy saving, reduced production, cancelled projects and 
a crippled economy.
For a future growing and healthy economy, South Africa needed huge 
amounts of extra baseload electricity and this could best be provided 
by nuclear power.
Discussion: Q&A
Mr Alex Tsela: The models presented are evidence-based. Do we have 
evidence that the lack of energy depresses demand, or does the avail-
ability of energy stimulate demand?
Response, Prof Harald Winkler: The general approach in integrated 
resource planning is that they start with demand. The South African 
public wants services. This should be the starting point. I am not aware 
of any evidence that supply generates demand.   
Response, Mr Andrew Kenny: There is a huge cost to the economy 
when there is inability to supply electricity when it is needed. 
Response, Mr Dennis Britz: Industry will not invest if there is uncertainty in 
terms of energy availability. 
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Dr Dawid Serfontein: I was perplexed by the chart in Mr Bowen’s presen-
tation that showed that electricity demand decreased but the econ-
omy grew. My study of the matter showed that the cost of electricity 
affected the economic sectors differently. 
Response, Mr Bowen: When measuring GDP, value-add is measured. 
Value-add in the secondary and tertiary economies is growing at a 
faster rate than the value-add from primary economy. Even if electricity 
is being produced to supply a mine, where many other services are 
being provided and they are growing at the same level, the value-
add out of these services generally tends to be higher than mining. This 
has been the case since 2005. It is necessary to bear in mind that GDP 
represents the value-add and not the physical product. It is necessary 
to consider that gold mining, the most energy intensive component, 
has been declining at a steady rate. This means that if other mining is 
growing, it is not as energy intensive as gold mining and it means that 
the economy is growing in those areas that have less of an impact 
on electricity demand. We are not suggesting that mining stops, but 
that mining is going to be less energy intensive and the other sectors 
connected to mining will have high value-add.
Dr Kelvin Kemm: South Africa has the same size population as South 
Korea, and South Korea has double the electricity consumption as 
South Africa. There must be a reason for this. I cannot see that South 
Africa is not aiming to double its electricity consumption in a short time.
Mr Dennis Britz: Once industry has certainty on the price going forward 
and the availability of electricity then we will probably see new 
investment. Until then, there will be no new investment. 
Mr Saliem Fakir: Andrew Kenny’s data from Germany are misleading. 
The debate in Germany is about where the burden of the cost is being 
transferred. This debate requires more granularity. The cost of electricity 
in Germany per GDP output has stabilised and in some periods it has 
decreased. Talking about green technology as adding a burden to the 
economy is somewhat senseless as the broader benefits of renewable 
energy need to be taken into account. It is important to provide the 
proper context. 
Response, Mr Andrew Kenny: Figures show that the cost of electricity in 
Germany has soared since the green revolution. The fact is that people 
cannot pay their bills and industries are relocating.
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Response, Mr Dennis Britz: In Germany private households are subsidising 
industry so that industry can survive and grow.
Prof Tomas Kåberger: I do not understand Mr Kenny’s statement that a 
kWh of nuclear energy displaces CO2 emissions whilst a kWh of renew-
ables would not. 
Response, Mr Andrew Kenny: One kWh of wind does not displace 
one kWh of fossil fuel. The reason is, because of the wild fluctuations in 
wind and something else has to compensate, and this is usually a gas 
turbine. Fluctuation means inefficiency and more CO2 being emitted 
than it otherwise would. The other point is that in order to allow for 
unpredictable fluctuations in the future there is a much bigger spinning 
reserve on the grid that also uses up electricity. 
Prof Philip Lloyd: In assessing the IRP 2010 and its update, what was the 
extent to which the risk factors associated with the delivery from the 
renewable energy side were taken into account? The cost of nuclear 
versus some of the other technologies is very high. 
Response, Mr Dennis Britz: Industry is still waiting for renewables that run 
24/7. Industry needs baseload to operate in the country. Nuclear and 
coal, and hydro if available, are the better options.
Prof Anton Eberhard: Mr Kenny dismissed wind as being too expensive 
and not providing reasonable amounts of power. Could Mr Bowen 
report on the experience of the renewable energy independent power 
producers (IPPs) that have been connected? A number of the wind 
and solar plants have already been connected and production figures 
are available. Do you have a sense of what power wind and solar is 
displacing and its economic value on the system?
Response, Mr Keith Bowen: We had assumed in the model that wind 
would on average have a 30% load factor and PV on average 18%. 
The model has a geographic profile for likely load factors for each of 
these technologies. The one downside of the model is that it assumes 
this profile, rather than actual performance, which is a shortcoming that 
we are working on. In terms of the actual output of renewables thus far, 
wind on average for February and March 2014 is above 32% to 33% load 
factors for the four sites that are currently operational. We have seen 
25% load factors on average for PV and one site is going up to 34%. 
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This shows that the model was conservative for renewables. We have 
only reported on two or three months and we will have to get at least 
a year’s worth of data to see what happens during different periods 
of the year. In price terms, the renewable energy IPP programme has 
delivered wind contracts as low as 66c/kWh.
Ms Manisha Gulati: 
1) If Fukushima was not a disaster, as Mr Kenny argues, why did the 
Japanese government undo its nuclear power programme? 
2)  If wind turbines are an eyesore on the Garden Route, could it be 
assumed that nuclear power would keep South Africa as one of the 
top tourist destinations?
Response, Mr Andrew Kenny: 
1) At Fukushima, with the worst possible circumstances, the result was 
that nobody was killed. This is an extraordinary tribute to nuclear 
safety. 
2) It would take about 3 000 wind turbines to produce the same 
amount of electricity as Koeberg, but they would not be able to 
replace Koeberg because of unpredictable supply. 
Mr Dennis Britz: Industry needs affordability, certainty and predictability. 
Mr Saliem Fakir: The WWF is well beyond the polemics about renewables. 
We have recognised renewables as part of the energy mix and as a 
serious investment. We must consider the empirical evidence that is 
emerging with the installation of renewables in terms of cost, capacity 
factors and so on, and not engage in polemics where incorrect fact 
and figures are bandied about. 
Nuclear Energy and the NDP 
(Prof Anton Eberhard, Graduate School of Business, UCT)
Energy, particularly nuclear energy, involves huge capital requirements, 
much larger than other infrastructure sectors, and hence technology 
choices and investment decisions are important public policy issues in 
South Africa. The decisions that had to be made in the next few years 
would be crucial in economic terms and in relation to choices about 
future energy security for the country. 
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Energy issues had been addressed in the NDP chapter on infrastructure 
and the energy vision was informed by economic growth and devel-
opment, social equity and environmental sustainability, supported by 
good governance. The diagnostic exercise undertaken by the Nation-
al Planning Committee (NPC) at the beginning of its work showed that 
the biggest gain in the energy sector since 1994 had been in access to 
electricity. Electricity had been reliable and cheap, although arguably 
at uneconomic prices. Since 2005, security of supply had been under 
threat and prices had trebled in order to reach more economic levels. 
The reform process had stalled within the electricity sector and renew-
able energy remained a minor contributor to supply. 
The concerns about security of petroleum supply and storage infrastruc-
ture had still not been addressed. Coal was of economic importance 
and among the three top export earners, yet exports had stagnated 
because of inadequate rail infrastructure. Domestic use of coal had 
increased and South Africa had become the 13th largest CO2 emitter 
globally. Energy intensity (kWh/GDP) had continued to decline since 
2007, but incentives and programmes promoting energy efficiency re-
mained modest and haphazard. Energy issues cut across a number of 
government departments and there was a need for better coordina-
tion and more consistent progress. 
Some of the key energy proposals in the NDP concerned:
• security of coal supplies to Eskom; 
• expansion of coal exports; 
• upgrading of oil refineries to Euro5 standards;
• delaying investment in new refineries until warranted by demand; 
• development of a gas master plan (liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
imports, Mozambique pipeline, off-shore, shale); 
• procurement of sustainable renewable energy; 
• reform of the electricity market and the electricity distribution 
industry.
The NDP stated the following about nuclear:
• “South Africa needs a thorough investigation of the implications of 
nuclear energy, including its costs, financing options, institutional 
arrangements… a potential nuclear fleet will involve a level 
of investment unprecedented in South Africa. An in-depth 
investigation into the financial viability of nuclear energy is thus 
vital”; 
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• “South Africa needs an alternative plan – ‘Plan B’ – should nuclear 
energy prove too expensive, sufficient financing be unavailable or 
timelines too tight. All possible alternatives need to be explored”.
The NDP also stated the following about energy planning:
• Energy planning needed to become more holistic and integrated.
• The NPC had engaged with the DoE around both the Integrated 
Energy Plan (IEP) and the IRP. 
• There were concerns that the IEP would be viewed as a rigid 
master plan, while underplaying the role of the much more 
detailed and robust sub-sector plans such as the IRP.
• The NPC had commissioned modelling from the ERC in order to 
catalyse the updating of the IRP. 
The broad philosophy underpinning the updated IRP was a sense that 
decision-making would change as conditions changed, as illustrated in 
a set of decision trees.
     
The NPC supported the IRP update proposal that if electricity demand 
was lower and nuclear prices were above US$ 6 500 then it would be 
better to use more imported hydro, gas or other options.  
Two data points provided an indication of nuclear energy investment 
costs relating to the latest contracts, namely the Hinkley B nuclear plant 
in the United Kingdom at an investment cost of US$ 8 150/kW and a 
Russian reactor in Hungary at an investment cost of US$ 7 031/kW. It was 
important to understand what these costs include. Ultimately, given the 
large discrepancies in nuclear cost assumptions it would be prudent 
to quote figures that came from actual signed contracts and market 
prices. 
The NPC had raised two core concerns around nuclear energy: 
• Costs 
o It was important to get more accurate costs, particularly in 
respect of investment costs. 
o The economic impact of cost and time overruns on large 
capital intensive projects, such as nuclear plants in France and 
Finland, had been catastrophic.  
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• Financing 
o The South African government was not in a position to offer 
investment capital for nuclear, given the country’s fiscal and 
debt constraints.  
o Risk allocation was critical as government and consumers, and 
not nuclear vendors, could bear the risk if nuclear projects went 
over time or budget. 
The NPC advocated adopting a path of least regret, by:
• adopting dynamic and flexible electricity planning;
• avoiding locking in mega capital-intensive power projects with risks 
of cost overruns and long and uncertain build times;
• investing in a diverse range of energy sources with shorter lead 
times that can be brought online incrementally to meet changing 
electricity demand.
The NPC recognised that a range of energy options was available and 
viable in South Africa, in particular smaller coal, gas, renewable energy 
and energy efficiency. 
Comparative Costs of Nuclear and Coal-based Power 
(Dr Dawid Serfontein, School of Mechanical and Nuclear 
Engineering, North-West University (NWU))
The IEP and IRP update laid an excellent foundation and presented 
a very comprehensive set of data and used sophisticated modelling 
tools. Dr Serfontein reviewed both documents on behalf of the Nucle-
ar Industry Association of South Africa (NIASA) and claimed to have 
found a number of serious flaws that skewed results to the detriment of 
nuclear. Similar flaws were also discovered in about 90% of the nuclear 
costing studies examined. 
The results of modelling done by the NWU in terms of the business case 
for nuclear indicated that nuclear plants were twice as expensive as 
coal, but lasted for 60 years instead of 25 to 50 years in the case of 
coal plants. The cost of capital was the deciding factor in a decision 
about whether or not to opt for nuclear. The LCOE was calculated 
as a function of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), a 
combination of the interest rate paid on loans and the profit earned. 
A conservative approach, applying full external (including accident 
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evacuation) costs, was taken. The overnight cost was estimated at US$ 
5 500/kW for the expected case and US$ 7 000/kW for a pessimistic 
case, for generation III type reactors. The only external cost for the 
expected case for coal was R 120/ton CO2 tax. For the pessimistic coal 
case, the full external costs were taken into account. Excluding the 
very high health costs of coal was the most serious flaw in the IEP, the 
IRP and most other studies. 
The LCOE, as a function of post-tax WACC demonstrated the depen-
dence of nuclear viability on the cost of capital. It would be too ex-
pensive to build nuclear at 8% WACC. However, Eskom currently bor-
rows money at a real interest rate of just below 3% and the WACC 
percentage was similarly regulated by the National Energy Regula-
tor of South Africa (NERSA). At these rates, nuclear power would be 
cheaper than coal power, even for the pessimistic nuclear case. Coal 
would be less profitable than nuclear if the electricity selling price 
(R/kWh) remained low. Government would make a larger profit out of 
the nuclear plant. If government’s intention was to make the maximum 
nominal profit from Eskom, then it would do best to invest in nuclear. 
Even if the intention was to supply electricity at the lowest price to in-
dustry in order to stimulate growth, nuclear-powered electricity would 
still be supplied at a lower price than coal power. Unlike other studies, 
the calculations for the model were based on the full plant life (60 years 
for nuclear and 50 years for coal). The IEP and IRP made provision for 
nuclear plants to be built by about 2025 and the model ran until 2050. 
Only 25 years of the 60-year plant life were reflected in the IEP and 
the IRP results, grossly underestimating its capacity to reduce CO2 emis-
sions.
In conclusion, new nuclear would produce electricity more profitably 
than coal if funded with low cost capital. The external cost of new 
nuclear (R0.005/kWh) is about 50 times lower than that of coal (R0.26/
kWh).  South Africa should therefore deploy nuclear as a long lead 
time, cheap baseload technology, targeting the minimum expected 
growth in baseload demand, adding peaking technologies and quickly 
deployable technologies to address looming shortages in supply, as 
and when they appear. 
The IEP and IRP update used an unrealistically high real discount rate 
(the IEP used an economic opportunity cost of capital (EOCK) of 11.3%) 
and massively underestimated the cost efficiency of nuclear power for 
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reducing CO2 emissions. In the IEP, the DoE used a real discount rate 
of 11.3%, instead of a more realistic 5.3%, which would have produced 
fundamentally different optimisation results. The IRP update used a 
WACC of 8%. As technology-specific loan offers from nuclear vendor 
countries eliminate the opportunity cost of capital for nuclear, it is 
recommended that a real post-tax WACC/discount rate of 3% should 
be used.
More flaws in the IEP and IRP were:
• Intermittency costs of wind and PV solar were not taken into 
account.
• ‘Time of day’ electricity selling prices were not taken into account, 
unfairly benefitting intermittent sources, especially PV.
• Imported CO2 emissions were ignored. This led to the IEP 
recommendation in some scenarios that South Africa should 
import 90% of its energy (petrol, diesel, natural gas and coal and 
hydro power), which would cause massive local job losses in South 
Africa and serious problems in the balance of payments, and 
would threaten national security.
• External costs were not internalised, benefitting coal and gas, but 
discriminating against nuclear and wind. 
The flaws in the IEP and the IRP should be corrected, and thereafter a 
more cost-effective technology mix will emerge. 
Facing Up to Uncertainty in the Power Sector:  
The Impact on Technology Choice and Investment 
Decision-making 
(Dr Grové Steyn, Meridian Economics)
The task of planning in the energy sector should address optimal 
technology choices and investment decisions in the face of uncertainty. 
Superficially, the problem amounted to choosing projects in the face 
of a highly uncertain future so that the returns (benefits) generated 
would be greater than their costs over time. Central to this challenge 
were the interrelated problems: uncertainty, and asset specificity and 
irreversibility. 
The terms ‘risk’ or ‘uncertainty’ were used to describe the state of knowl-
edge about the future in the absence of certainty. Andrew Stirling from 
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the University of Sussex coined the term ‘incertitude’ and made the 
distinction between risk (where contingencies were known and proba-
bilities were objectively assigned), uncertainty (either future contingen-
cies could not all be known, or probabilities could not be objectively 
assigned) and ignorance (neither all contingencies nor probabilities 
were known). The message was that we do not know what we do not 
know. The problem was bigger than we thought and was generally 
underestimated. It led to what economists called ‘bounded rationality’ 
and the fact that humans suffered from a systemic inability to compre-
hend the nature, scope and scale of uncertainty (incertitude).
Aspects of incertitude that affected energy projects included:
• Capital cost: A project could lose value because an asset might 
cost more to create that that originally predicted and construction 
could take longer. 
• Running costs and revenues: Running costs could be higher 
than anticipated and benefits could be less than anticipated. 
Competing technologies or energy sources could emerge 
rendering existing technologies obsolete. 
Asset specificity and irreversibility meant that the assets were specific 
to an industry and could not easily be put to use in another industry. 
The viability of a power project was entirely dependent on the realised 
construction costs and not the forecasted costs, the realised value 
of the operating and fuel costs, and the value of its output over time 
given the risks. The key question was whether long-term planning would 
make any sense if forecasts were known to be incorrect, and the world 
was going to be a very different place in 15 to 20 years’ time. Perhaps 
future strategies should be thought about differently.
At least three important perspectives shaped decision-making in the 
power sector: those of
• society (real economics and social welfare);
• managers of companies, concerned about business economics, 
cash flows and profit;
• providers of finance, concerned about financial economics, 
interest rates and dividend yield.
It was very important when referring to the cost of capital, risks and so 
forth to distinguish between private financing cost and public opportu-
nity cost of capital. Power sector policy should, in the first instance, be 
concerned with the public opportunity cost in the real economy and 
the maximisation of social welfare.
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In terms of project appraisal, discounted cash flow analysis comprised 
the following steps: 
• Generate unbiased estimates of cash flows. 
• Determine the risk associated with different cash flows.
• Determine appropriate discount rates.
• Calculate net present value (NPV) and levelised cost (in the case 
of power sector).
Some key points about the discount rate (WACC and capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM)) were:
• The nature of ownership (public or private) did not, a priori, affect 
the real economy risks of a project.
• The discount rate was best determined on the basis of financing 
cost (corrected for risk shifting).
In other words, there should be no a priori difference between the 
private and public sectors in the way that uncertainty was reflected 
in investment appraisal. There was only one (risk adjusted) opportunity 
cost of capital. Furthermore, it was not only the discount rate that 
mattered. Cash flows with different uncertainty profiles should be 
discounted at their risk appropriate discount rate. Individual cost 
streams needed to be separated from each other into groups that had 
similar risk profiles and different discount rates should be used for each 
group within one project. In doing so, appraisal optimism, endemic in 
power sector decision-making, should be challenged, remembering 
that humans were bound by rationality and ‘ignorance’. 
It was necessary to understand the shortcomings of the discount cash 
flow (DCF) methodology in the levelised cost approach. DCF did not 
allow for a detailed comparison of investment options on the basis of 
their risk profiles, but looked at investments as a once-off opportunity 
and did not reflect the fact that the investments could be delayed 
or phased. DCF did not enable explicit comparative evaluation of 
the flexibility in projects to deal with uncertainty, nor did it address the 
problem of uncertainty and ignorance (incertitude). DCF/levelised 
cost comparisons that did not attempt to address these fundamental 
shortcomings had little real world value. It was necessary to bring in 
other approaches, such as real option valuation, which went some 
way to remedy these shortcomings, or a ‘what-if’ analysis, especially 
to show the impact of new (competing) resources or technologies 
emerging during the project life.
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Strategies that would improve project value in the face of uncertainty 
were:
• Incrementalism: ‘The science of muddling through’ (Lindblom, 
1959; 1979), an effective response to complexity and uncertainty 
in the context of bounded rationality and poses a challenge to the 
mastery-via-understanding tradition of Western civilisation.
• Flexibility (of an investment): Allowing for trial-and-error learning 
(Collingridge, 1992) and enabling early adaptation to changing 
circumstances therefore reducing the costs of potential errors 
(Collingridge and James, 1991).
• Diversity (of a system): Promoting beneficial forms of innovation 
and growth, hedging against exposure to uncertainty and 
ignorance, mitigating the adverse effects of institutional 
‘momentum’ and ‘locking-in’ in technological trajectories, and 
accommodating disparate interests associated with social choice 
in modern pluralistic societies (Stirling (1998: 37)).
These principles can be translated to the debate around nuclear power 
and to the question about the correct discount rate for nuclear by:
• Ensuring that the cash flows were adjusted for the shortcomings 
in the DCF approach in respect of bias, including the impact of 
uncertainty and ignorance and the complexity of construction 
and commissioning, as well as real option cost and benefits of 
different technologies. 
• Making the point that a single number could not be used for a 
whole project or for different projects. Projects would have to be 
deconstructed in order to understand the different risk streams 
and set the appropriate discount rates. The correct discount rate 
should reflect the risk of revenues that were reliant on the price 
that was greater or equal to the full levelised costs over its life. 
Discussion: Q&A
Prof Tomas Kåberger: Dr Serfontein’s presentation and his precision in 
terms of the external cost were impressive. The most important thing 
when comparing the interest rate is that a very low discount rate will 
mean that solar and wind will be very competitive and nuclear will 
have slightly higher costs followed by coal and gas. Another problem 
with nuclear is calculating the cost of waste management and de-
commissioning. Had you included this or had you assumed a fixed cost 
for decommissioning and waste management irrespective of the inter-
est rate? 
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Response, Dr Dawid Serfontein: I did not do it like that but because it is a 
small cost and the error is not important. I added waste management 
as a fixed cost of R0.03c/kWh every year. This is shown in the cash flow 
and is affected by the discount rate or the actual WACC and will go 
up if these are higher. 
Prof Anton Eberhard: 
1)  Dr Serfontein, you referred to very long operational times of 60 years. 
Did you build in refurbishment expenses along the way? 
2)  I noticed that some of your colleagues from the NWU also published 
a paper on the cost of nuclear and came to opposite conclusions, 
namely that coal is much cheaper than nuclear. How do you 
explain the discrepancies?
Response, Dr Dawid Serfontein: 
1) I worked in refurbishment expenses at 10% or 15% in year 35.  Things 
that happen late in the life of the plant do not count too much in 
present value. Therefore the 10% or 15% has a small effect on the 
levelised cost of electricity. 
2)  I know the study well and do not agree with their view. My colleagues 
used a high WACC. I wrote a document in opposition to their work 
but it has not yet been published. I am critical of their work. They 
also did not take the health costs of coal into account. The flaws 
that I detected in the IEP and the IRP, I also detected in their work.
Prof Philip Lloyd: Prof Eberhard insisted that the NDP should include the 
constraints of climate change and how to address it. At what stage do 
we remove the constraints given the fact it is a global problem and the 
global society is doing nothing about CO2 emissions? Why should South 
Africa take CO2 into account when the global society is doing nothing?
Response, Prof Anton Eberhard: I do not think it is true that nothing has 
been done in respect of mitigating climate change, although the am-
bitions of some have not been fulfilled. The NPC’s perspective was that 
it was prudent to start thinking about these matters. We are one of the 
more vulnerable countries in terms of our reliance on carbon, and the 
country with among the highest dependence on coal for electricity 
generation in the world. There are some concerns about the potential 
exposure of South African trade in terms of border tariffs in the future 
linked to the extent to which our exports rely on dirty energy. There is a 
more positive way to think about this. Look at how the electricity plan 
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has been transformed since a carbon cap has been imposed on the 
modelling. This has forced us to look for alternatives. Previously, all plans 
were centred on coal and so coal power stations were built. We have 
now considered renewables and through embarking on an interesting 
IPP programme in renewable energy, we have been able to see what 
the market can do and what innovation can take place. Three years 
ago one could not have predicted that wind prices would be below 
70c/kWh. PV prices dropped 68% between round 1 and round 3, and 
wind prices by 42% between the rounds. Through adopting a kind of 
self-imposed carbon cap and deciding to go for a more diversified en-
ergy mix, South Africa has been exposed to interesting innovation and 
experience, which can only add to our energy security going forward. 
Unknown person: Dr Serfontein mentioned that nuclear was not good 
for peak load. It is wrong to maintain that nuclear cannot handle 
peak load. In France, about 80% of the country is run on nuclear and it 
handles peak load very well. 
Response, Dr Dawid Serfontein: Nuclear plants can do peak following 
but the load factor decreases; this is a problem because a lower load 
factor means a lower profit. In France, the main cost of nuclear plants 
is the capital cost. If the load factor goes down the cost of electricity 
goes up. Although load following by a nuclear plant is possible, it neg-
atively affects operations and profit. A certain chemical (Xenon-135) is 
released and increases inside a nuclear reactor if power is decreased, 
poisoning the reactor and causing operational problems. 
Prof Harald Winkler: I agree with Dr Serfontein that external costs should 
be included. The ERC researchers engaged with National Treasury 
and the response was that 11.3% was intended as real discount rate 
and not a nominal one, reflecting not only the cost of capital, but also 
an opportunity cost to South Africa. With regard to your comments in 
relation to the LCOE and the long lifetime of nuclear, it should be noted 
that our modelling calculates the LCOE of different technologies based 
on their projected lifetimes and not the modelling period.
Response, Dr Dawid Serfontein: I have read that the discount rate 
should also be decreased later in life. After 20 years, the plant is paid 
off. If there are two plants at the same cost and one works for only 30 
years and the other works for up to 60 years, the high discount rate 
model will indicate that there is no benefit for the plant with the longer 
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life. However, there is obviously a benefit because it works longer. If a 
plant works for double the time it also mitigates double the amount 
of CO2 emissions. Thus, this is a real benefit, which is hidden by the 
unrealistically high discount rate.
Dr Kelvin Kemm: Long-term planning does make sense. We are in 
a position in history where we are able to do this. We have certain 
reaches into the future that we did not have in the past. Instead of 
projecting into the distant future we should look at what we have got 
and what we can do, and use this for long-term planning. 
Dr Grové Steyn: I realise that I am challenging a paradigm. Unfortu-
nately it is our history that challenges this paradigm that we hold on to. 
If we want to stop repeating history, which we are currently bound to 
do, we need to take a long hard look at what we are doing. My PhD 
research was the basis of a paper I wrote that foresaw Eskom’s current 
situation by looking at what had happened earlier on, in respect of 
Eskom’s planning in the 1970s and 1980s and what happened in the 
UK with the Central Electricity Generating Board around technology 
issues and forecasting uncertainty and so forth. The question is what 
are the lessons we can learn? Things go very wrong in almost every 
infrastructure sector. Do we continue doing the same things and ex-
pecting different outcomes? This will not help. We need to find new 
ways to approach the issue. One of the lessons is that there is a price 
to uncertainty and risk. The greater the uncertainty when it moves to 
the realms of ignorance, the more chance there is of getting long-term 
planning wrong. Long-term planning cannot be done. It does not work. 
We need sensible strategies for the long term as opposed to a single 
long-term plan. This is why the IRP update is very different from the orig-
inal IRP 2010 as it is based on scenarios and not a single long-term plan. 
This is a step in the right direction as we are beginning to recognise our 
limits as humans. This does not mean that technology is not wonderful. 
Technology and the economy are so wonderful that we cannot pre-
dict them. 
Prof Rob Adam: With regard to the NPC’s view on importing power from 
outside South Africa, the generally received view is that you should not 
get more than your reserve margin from outside your own country. 
The local construction industry is backing off from renewables in South 
Africa and looking north because the tariff that you can get in other 
African countries is better than what the tariff will be here. A different 
Our Nuclear Future Delay or Demise?
29
kind of company will bid for South African projects. They will probably 
fund projects off the balance sheet of utilities and local companies will 
not be able to compete. 
Response, Prof Anton Eberhard: Currently South Africa has very low 
exposure to imports in electricity. There are some very good projects in 
the region (apart from the Grand Inga Dam project in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC)) that are very attractive in terms of 
cost and supply security. There are diverse sources of gas. In five to 
seven years, knowledge of our offshore and shale gas resources will 
be much better. There are a range of indigenous sources that could 
help diversify our sources and increase supply security. In respect of 
renewables, the trend that you described is correct. The returns that 
companies are earning on round 3 versus round 1 are much lower and 
it has become much more competitive. It is interesting that round 3 
had a record number of bids at 93, only 17 of which were awarded. 
There will probably still be competition in rounds 4 and 5, which will be 
good for consumers. 
Dr Kelvin Kemm: I take issue with the comment that more competitive 
wind prices are good for consumers. The case for wind was generated 
in the first place for political reasons because of a belief in CO2 
causing global warming, which is turning out not to be the case. Wind 
is not practical and is still very expensive compared to coal, nuclear 
and other technologies. We organise contracts in South Africa, as in 
many places in the world, where people who put in wind power are 
guaranteed long-term money from the government at the taxpayers’ 
expense. Wind is not an energy solution but a political reaction to an 
international political issue. 
Response, Prof Anton Eberhard: It was hoped that ideological positions 
against particular technology choices would not be taken at this 
symposium. It was important to have an evidence-based discussion 
around the options including nuclear. Let us be careful about what has 
been said about wind. Bids for wind in Brazil are even more competitive 
than in South Africa. Wind energy is not being subsidised in Brazil or 
South Africa. Furthermore, Eskom is getting data on actual output of 
wind and PV from the projects that have connected. 
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It is very interesting that at different parts of the load curve, wind is 
displacing more expensive energy sources. We must look at the 
economic value that the technology provides, and while it is not a 
panacea, it is a very useful potential contributor to the energy mix 
going forward.  
Mr Andrew Kenny: When you are looking at investing in a power 
station, one thing that makes it a safer investment is that the product 
(electricity) never changes. This means that one massive risk to industry 
(the risk that there will not be a market for its product) does not exist.
Response, Dr Grové Steyn: There is risk for a particular project based 
on a particular cost profile. First there is the demand side. There might 
not be demand for the product or the demand forecast might be 
wrong. Now that the prices reflect the true costs more accurately 
there is a response from the market. Energy efficiency, demand-side 
management and other factors affect the demand for electricity. 
Competitors may be able to sell electricity at a lower price and cost 
than you in ten years’ time. If the project can be displaced by cheaper 
technology in the future then this is a risk that has to be considered. 
Prof Rob Adam concluded that progress had been made in shaping 
some of the issues that decision-makers would be faced with from the 
economic and financial perspective in making energy choices in terms 
of the final, updated IRP. 
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SESSION TWO: 
OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
(CHAIR: PROF ANTON EBERHARD, UNIVERSITY OF 
CAPE TOWN)
International Trends in Nuclear Power Investment and 
Costs 
(Prof Tomas Kåberger, Chalmers University, Sweden)
“Plans are useless, planning is everything” (words attributed to General, 
and later US President, Eisenhower). 
The process of trying to understand what may happen in the future 
and the ability to act quickly when conditions change are extremely 
important. In the energy policy debate in Europe, especially in Swe-
den, the most important constructive step taken as a result of work 
done by the Energy Commission and energy researchers was to un-
bundle the electricity grid from the production and trade in electrici-
ty. Private investors had to decide on the most profitable alternatives. 
The attitude of researchers and others who tried to assess costs was 
very different when the decision-makers were responsible for the invest-
ments they made and more constructive than when those experts who 
made claims about costs were passing the responsibility for the actual 
investment to others. This applied to very large investments, as well as 
any small-scale investments in renewables. This change had been ex-
tremely constructive for the actual efficiency of the electricity system 
development, as well as for the debate, and had improved security of 
supply because those who promised to deliver electricity were obliged 
to do so or pay. 
The construction of nuclear reactors during the previous century peak-
ed in the 1980s. The global nuclear industry declined in the 1990s and 
many of the vendors left the industry during this period. Around the turn 
of the century there was hope for a revival of nuclear. High oil prices, 
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climate change concerns, local air pollution and increased fears of de-
pendence on oil supplies from a few, mainly Middle Eastern countries, 
added to the need for other sources of energy and electricity in par-
ticular. For many years there were only a few reactor construction proj-
ects but statistics from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
showed that the number of ongoing reactor construction projects had 
increased in the last decade. The increase was largely due to a num-
ber of reactor projects in China and a few other countries and many 
of these projects had been ongoing for a very long time. However, 
the number of operating reactors had decreased to the lowest level in 
almost 20 years. 
One of the main reasons why the nuclear industry had problems com-
peting was that the cost of nuclear reactors in the world had often 
been higher than anticipated when the decisions were made. The fact 
that the real costs were higher than anticipated was an important fac-
tor for investors. Learning curves for nuclear power, using the French 
and the US nuclear reactor projects as a source of data, showed that 
costs increased as experience was gained, partly due to a greater 
awareness of risks resulting in more precautions and cumulative com-
plexity of the plants. 
A project that had attracted much attention in Europe was the Olkiluoto 
3 plant, built in Finland with Areva supplying the nuclear components 
and Siemens supplying the electricity generation components. The 
project had been delayed and the owner of the plant had recently 
reported that Areva could no longer provide a plan for completion. 
Making cost projections was often described as an art and not a sci-
ence. The Finnish plant was an example of the difficulties of seeing the 
real costs. The contract price was €3.2 billion and it was supposed to be 
a turnkey contract with a time schedule. However, costs have soared. 
Areva had set aside €3.9 billion as anticipated losses by 2014. In ad-
dition, there were provisions for contract completion and Areva had 
sued the customer for the delays and extra costs of the project to the 
amount of €2.7 billion. In turn, the customer had claimed €1.8 billion 
from Areva. The total cost had therefore reached €12.4 billion. The ad-
dition of interest during construction would bring the total cost to €16 
billion, which at an interest rate of 8% would result in electricity costs of 
about €100 /MWh from this plant. Although this was not a typical case, 
it could discourage private investors from investing in complex projects 
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such as nuclear, necessitating significant state guarantees and state 
subsidies. 
An insignificant number of new plants had been taken into operation 
during this century. Japan’s maximum nuclear generation was in 1998 
when the official policy of increasing nuclear power in Japan failed, 
although it did not collapse until the Fukushima accident in 2011. In 
Sweden, nuclear power generation peaked in 2004, in the rest of the 
world it peaked in 2006 and in the US it peaked in 2010. This would 
not have occurred if nuclear power and fossil fuels had been the only 
alternative sources of electricity. The use of renewables had increased 
dramatically. 
Wind power was the most significant increasing contributor. It had not 
been predicted in the last century that China would be the highest 
producer of wind power in the world. Wind power had overtaken 
nuclear power production in China in recent years. That country had 
completed one wind power plant every hour throughout the year for 
the last five years and had built the most nuclear plants. Cost figures 
published in 2013 in the US indicated that wind power plants built in 
2012 had cost US$ 40/MWh, a cost that was competitive with any 
other source of electricity. In Australia and India, wind power was 
cost competitive with coal without subsidies. The unreliability factor of 
wind generation had shown to be manageable. More than one third 
of Denmark’s annual electricity was from wind power. That country 
had found solutions to all the challenges of varying wind power and 
its parliament had taken a decision to increase wind power to 50% of 
the annual energy generation by 2050. Denmark had experienced 
oversupply that resulted in negative electricity prices. 
Solar had also shown substantial growth. Germany built the most solar 
power plants, which were paid for by German households. Ten years 
ago, the idea was to subsidise solar in order to bring down costs and 
make solar competitive globally. It was calculated that if all Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) electricity 
customers shared that cost it would be approximately R0.01 /kWh, but 
solar power was much more expensive because the full cost was car-
ried by German households. Recently, costs had come down and in 
the last year many countries were investing in and installing new solar 
power plants. The German transformation had led to an increase in re-
newables by about 110 TWh since the turn of the century and nuclear 
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had decreased by about 75 TWh, and renewables had largely been 
used to increase exports and reduce the share of fossil fuels in the elec-
tricity supply. 
China’s recent five-year plan increased targets for renewables, 
particularly targets for solar, which were to increase by 27 000% by 2020. 
Although some economists did not trust environmentalists or scientists, 
the Financial Times published an article citing reports stating that an 
unsubsidised solar revolution had begun and this drew the interest of 
many financiers to solar energy technology, which led to even lower 
costs of solar power as financing of PV installation became easier.
The traditional power industry faced numerous problems. Nuclear waste 
costs were not negligible. Although good planning ought to keep costs 
under control, this had failed in Britain, one of the pioneering nuclear 
nations. If the £70 billion spent on managing a single nuclear waste 
site had been invested in wind power plants, between 125 and 150 
TWh would be produced every year, more than all the British nuclear 
power plants had ever managed to deliver in a year. Although the 
power industry may not have changed for 100 years, it was currently 
undergoing dramatic change. An article in the Wall Street Journal 
reported that US companies were unplugging from the grid. This was a 
clear indication that grid-connected power was an unsafe investment. 
Companies in the US found it cheaper and more reliable to provide their 
own electricity generation with some storage. In Europe some large 
power companies have had to write-off assets. European electricity 
providers faced an existential threat from the competition from new 
renewables, which had become cheap and would become cheaper 
and more competitive in the coming years. Nuclear investments were 
not very successful and the risks were increasing, while the cost of 
renewables was decreasing rapidly. This trend would continue into the 
foreseeable future.
The Case for Nuclear Power 
(Prof Philip Lloyd, Energy Institute, Cape Peninsula 
University of Technology (CPUT))
There had been all manner of attempts to predict future demand 
and most predictions had made the mistake of assuming compound 
growth. Many developing societies showed log-linear growth with time 
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but South Africa’s growth was linear. World Bank data showed how 
power had grown between 1971 and 2010 in several societies. South 
Africa followed linear growth similar to that of countries such as Belgium 
and Columbia, and surprisingly, followed the almost identical produc-
tion of power to Australia. South Africa had been faced with a supply 
constraint since 2007, as predicted by the DoE, and many large users 
had fallen away while others had come under threat. 
The last few years should be viewed as an aberration. It was essential 
to return to a linear view of the future where consumption would be 
4.0±0.5*1011 kWh by 2035 and 4.9±1*1011 kWh by 2050, comparable with 
the IRP update.  
How the country might meet its future demand has been the subject of 
much thought in recent years. In March 2011, Cabinet agreed to a final 
version of policy-adjusted IRP 2010, which had been revised to reflect 
some policy constraints. In November 2013, the DoE published an 
update of IRP 2010, which stressed greater flexibility in energy planning 
and dismissed the multi-criteria decision model. The latest idea of a 
decision tree was a much better way to address the problem. 
The IRP update focused strongly on providing the generating capacity 
to meet the peak demand. However, the ability to generate sufficient 
power to meet daily needs was as important as meeting peak demand. 
The IRP 2010 revised data were reassessed on a TWh per annum basis 
making certain assumptions, namely:
• Load factors of 85% for coal, 50% for combined cycle gas turbines 
(CCGT) and imported hydro, 60% for local hydro, 92% for nuclear, 
30% for wind and ‘other’ sources of power, 40% for CSP, 20% for PV, 
and 5% for OCGT and pumped storage.
• Baseload was 70% of coal, 100% of nuclear and hydro.
• Mid-merit was 30% of coal, 100% of CCGT and ‘other’ sources of 
power.
• Peaking was 100% of OCGT and pumped storage and 40% of CSP.
• Variable was 100% of PV and wind and 60% of CSP.
For illustration purposes the ‘SO Moderate’ scenario from the IRP update 
was used to plot the base, mid-merit, peaking and variable power to 
be expected, and the margin to be expected was calculated in order 
to assess how well the supply would meet the demand expected for 
the specific scenario in terms of TWh per annum. The margins were 
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erratic and plunged after 2025. All the scenarios were tested and 
produced the same results. Under the ‘Weathering the Storm’ scenario, 
the baseload decreased after 2025 because it reached the CO2 limit 
that had been set. This scenario provided baseload only in coal.  
The IRP update revision had problems because the focus on meeting 
the peak demand overlooked the need to meet the annual demand. 
Planning should take the annual demand as well as the peak demand 
into account. As presently planned, the country would move rapidly 
into another supply crisis from about 2020 onwards. The source of the 
supply crisis was the lack of growth in baseload supply in particular. In 
some of the IRP scenarios, baseload actually fell from 2020 onwards. The 
problem was accentuated by the planned growth in variable power 
sources. International experience showed that to accommodate the 
variability, it was essential to increase the reserve margin once variable 
exceeded ~5% of total supply coming from the variable power sources. 
Spinning reserve was necessary for when the sun did not shine or the 
wind did not blow. According to nearly all the scenarios, 5% would be 
exceeded in ~2025. The analysis of the IRP 2010 showed that this lack 
of baseload had arisen from the desire to avoid CO2 emissions. The 
‘preferred’ baseload technology as selected by the IRP update was 
still coal, with its inevitable carbon footprint. The obvious answer was 
to look to another technology such as nuclear, but this was actively 
avoided in the IRP update, which assumed a very high capital cost 
for nuclear plants, in the area of US$ 5 800/kW installed. In addition, 
the ‘sensitivity analysis’ increased the cost of nuclear even further 
to US$ 7 000/kW installed. The IRP update was supported by a good 
series of technical reports from the Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) in the US. The Institute’s cost estimates for all technologies were 
confirmed by the bidding as being higher than the average Eskom 
cost, but its estimate (in the area of US$ 3 200/kWh) for nuclear was not 
taken seriously. There was a clear indication of active avoidance of the 
consideration of nuclear in the IRP update. 
One of the prime drivers for nuclear was the desire for lower carbon 
emissions. South Africa had a policy to plateau emissions by 2025 and 
to decline thereafter. The DoE had stipulated that the energy industry 
may emit 235 million tons of CO2 a year from 2025 onwards and this 
would drive the energy plan because there were only ten years left to 
reach that target, which was non-negotiable. Therefore concrete steps 
would have to be taken to achieve the set target and a technology 
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would have to be found that met the requirement. Globally, generating 
electricity and emitting CO2 were linked and emissions could not be 
cut unless the technology of generation was changed. Only nuclear 
and gas would provide the required baseload. All the renewable 
energies cost more than Eskom’s average cost of power. The EPRI cost 
estimates were reasonable and credible. There was little option but 
to incorporate a nuclear fleet, unless substantial amounts of gas were 
found soon. Nuclear would keep the wheels of industry turning and 
keep electricity affordable. Koeberg was already Eskom’s lowest cost 
source. Nuclear would enable the country to meet some of the CO2 
targets. Germany and Japan had to scrap their targets because they 
chose to close their nuclear fleet. Without a doubt, nuclear power was 
an essential component of South Africa’s energy future.
Discussion: Q&A
Dr Dawid Serfontein: Prof Kåberger said that nuclear is not profitable 
in Europe. Is this because there are hidden subsidies and hidden 
costs from the renewables that are placed as a burden on the other 
generating technologies? When the sun shines and the wind blows, 
nuclear is expected to act as spinning reserve, which is a system cost 
that renewables place on nuclear. The bill should be sent to renewables 
but it is charged to the nuclear plant. The same applies to rooftop PV. 
In South Africa we produce power for R0.50 but it is sold for R1.50. The 
additional R1 is for distribution costs and taxes. Rooftop PV is sold at 
R1.50 to Eskom and this means that the hidden cost is that distribution 
costs and taxes are not paid. 
Response, Prof Tomas Kåberger: There are some differences in the 
various European countries. In Britain, there is a special contract for a 
new nuclear reactor. Even those who believe that nuclear power is 
expensive accept that this power plant will be profitable because at 
£92/MWh it should be capable of ‘burning money’. In most European 
countries we have an electricity market. Any producer offers electricity 
to the market and consumers bid for prices to buy. There is a price 
settlement at least every hour. The result is that a wind power plant 
can produce when the wind is blowing and will have to bid with many 
other wind power owners. The price will drop and less profit is made, 
with the exception of countries like Germany where there are feed-in 
tariffs, which make the market less efficient. The power plants that used 
to be the lowest marginal costs plants, coal and nuclear, can no longer 
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operate constantly because the bids from solar and wind will undercut 
their bids. Coal certainly does reduce the power in Germany at the 
moment. In managing electricity systems we see that the old concept 
of peak load and baseload has changed its meaning because the 
lowest marginal costs are no longer coal and nuclear but solar and 
wind. When they are available they will produce and deliver whilst coal 
and nuclear will come next, which in the longer term will mean that 
these power plants will not be able to operate throughout the year. On 
the other hand, power plants that are more flexible will become more 
valuable and profitable while coal and nuclear will be less profitable. 
This is the way the market is working and this is why there are large losses 
in the European power industry. I do not think it can be said that costs 
are being pushed over to coal and nuclear, but in Germany there are 
significant advantages from legislated fixed tariffs.  
Prof Rob Adam: How do the graphs (in Prof Kåberger’s presentation) 
look when the 2 000 MW of nuclear that China is aiming for by 2030, 
is installed. I am a little surprised that you always counterpose nuclear 
with renewables. In my view you need to have both. Nuclear, coal and 
gas are needed for baseload and unless the grid interconnectivity is 
profound, it will never be possible to go to 100% renewables. Categories 
are being confused in order to make another point. 
Response, Prof Tomas Kåberger: China’s last five-year plan was not clear 
about nuclear ambitions and there have been significant uncertainties 
in Chinese policy. Although they are building 28 nuclear reactors, this 
is less than they had planned originally. In China, the competition 
between renewables and nuclear is totally insignificant. In Europe, it 
is different because renewables provide a large share and prices are 
falling because of the supply of electricity with very low marginal cost. 
An investor will see that the opportunity to build ‘high investment cost 
low operating cost stable production’ units is not necessarily available. 
There is the challenge that if a new coal-fired power station or nuclear 
power station is built it will not be able to operate for 80% to 90% of 
the year, and this makes the economics much worse. Baseload is not 
the same thing as it was 20 years ago. There are not the same ‘low 
marginal cost high capital cost’ coal and nuclear plants as before. 
Now there are renewables that have different characteristics. 
Mr Andrew Kenny: When Prof Kåberger refers to nuclear projects, he 
refers only to projects that are unsuccessful and are all one kind of 
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reactor. There are reactors that are built cheaply, simply and on time 
all around the world. Modern nuclear plants are becoming simpler, not 
more complex. Production costs for nuclear are the cheapest of all 
technologies. In Denmark, one third of electricity produced is wind and 
Denmark has the highest electricity prices in Europe. France, which is 
80% nuclear, has one of the lowest electricity prices in Europe. In terms 
of bidding, in England, nuclear comes in at zero. The massive subsidy is 
this: In Britain and Germany, regardless of the demand, when the wind 
is blowing the customer is compelled to buy wind power. 
Response, Prof Kåberger: I agree that the European nuclear experiences 
are bad and there may be better experiences in other parts of the 
world. It is not easy to get trustworthy cost data from China, for example. 
I would like to see good performance data from real completed 
reactors. The most important thing is to have an open market where 
those who argue and take a stand are also those who pay. It is not really 
true that the subsidy is that grid companies in Germany are obliged 
to accept the electricity, because on the market the renewables will 
always offer their production at very low prices, close to zero. Even if 
there was not an obligation to receive the electricity they would offer 
their electricity. The feed-in tariff is a problem as that distorts the market. 
In Europe there is no feed-in tariff. The price paid for wind power is set 
by the renewables spot market and the plus certificate value. At least 
electricity generation is operated depending on the spot market price, 
which is a lot better than the German situation. 
Dr Kelvin Kemm: 
1)  We need to recognise that what is happening in Europe as in 
other places in the world is that there has been massive political 
interference in the electricity prices. There is no free market 
operating in this area. The reason why electricity prices go down to 
zero is that nobody wants it. The point with electricity is that it must 
be continuously and reliably available otherwise industry cannot 
run. Denmark’s solution to the variation, resulting from wind power, 
is a cost settlement every hour. South Africa is the same size as the 
whole of Europe and cost settlements between Cape Town and 
Johannesburg are not practical. We cannot look to Europe for our 
solutions and we must provide electricity at any time of the day or 
night to the people and industry in this country. 
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2)  Prof Kåberger quoted figures in TWh. A distinction must be made 
between TWh, TW, GW or MW.  Prices cannot be based on the 
total amount of nuclear or solar in a year. We need to be realistic 
about what we want. Renewables are intermittent by nature and 
will not provide continuous baseload. Political interference to put in 
renewables to supposedly save the planet from CO2 has placed the 
energy system in a serious situation.   
Response, Prof Tomas Kåberger: 
1)  I have no problem with the distinction between TWh and GW, as one 
cannot describe every point on earth in both energy and power 
terms in a graph. A selection must be picked and if you pick GW 
alone, renewables will look much better than in reality and if TWh 
are used then the availability at different points in time is missed.  
2)  It is true that the electricity market in Denmark is smaller than 
South Africa and that Denmark is interconnected. South Africa is 
nearly the same size as Europe and Europe’s electricity market is 
interconnected. We do trade in electricity every hour throughout 
the whole continent. It is not something that is isolated. It is possible 
to have a power market over many countries, with constraints in 
transmission capacity within the whole market. This is not a problem. 
The important thing with a functioning power market is that it actually 
improves the reliability. The supply security is higher in Europe now 
than what it was when there were monopolies. One important 
mechanism is that if you fail to deliver what you promised in the 
power market, you have to pay, unlike in national monopolies. This 
is a problem in Eskom. Reliability has improved in Europe and we 
do handle the fact that wind power is not perfectly predictable. 
Wind power owners who fail to honour the delivery commitments 
made have to pay. The system works surprisingly well and we are 
not worried about supply. 
Dr Grové Steyn: The examples used by Prof Kåberger illustrate my ex-
planation of risk and uncertainty when planning new power projects, 
particularly the risk of being displaced when a new technology dis-
places the cost. Is this a correct understanding? Are we finding that the 
older coal and some nuclear plants are essentially being displaced by 
cheaper renewable power through competition? Are we talking about 
a complete paradigm shift emerging in the power sector with the role 
of demand side and an intelligent grid, perhaps on par with what hap-
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pened in telecommunications 20 years ago? Is the way we are thinking 
about baseload, mid-merit and peaking no longer valid?
Response, Prof Tomas Kåberger: Yes, there are dramatic changes in the 
power sector. I try to avoid referring to baseload and intelligent grids. 
We can hope for information technologies that will help consumers 
utilise variations in electricity prices to save money by controlling their 
consumption. This is slowly beginning to happen. The risk spectrum for 
investors in this sector is very large at present and is not only a matter of 
new technologies changing the competitiveness in the electricity grid. 
People might start disconnecting from the grid. This would be a very 
dramatic shift.   
Dr Grové Steyn: We are talking about 9 600 MW of nuclear power, and 
finance of about R1 trillion. How does Prof Lloyd foresee this happening 
in South Africa given that the Department of Public Enterprises is in 
negotiation with National Treasury for a further bailout of Eskom? 
Response, Prof Philip Lloyd: It does not matter whether the 9 600 MW 
comes from renewables, coal or other technologies, it will still cost a 
great deal. The important question is about the timing of the installation 
of the fleet. This is not apparent. It is sensible that it is installed as a fleet 
because the learning curves will come out of building multiple reactors. 
In the IRP update, there is a very steep curve on improvement for CSP 
that is not revealed in the cost curves we have seen so far coming out 
of the bids. The DoE has completely underestimated the rate at which 
building a fleet of nuclear reactors would improve the learning curve. 
Facilitated Discussion on South Africa’s Nuclear Energy 
Future 
Costs of nuclear (specific investment costs and what these 
might be in the South African context)
Dr Kelvin Kemm: We can avoid the errors made elsewhere and we have 
to look at it from a South African perspective. What has happened at 
Medupi and Kusile power stations, some of the biggest power plants in 
the world, was that we did not take into account the gap in time and 
the loss of skills since building the previous power stations years ago. 
Some relearning had to be done to build these massive new power 
plants. These learnt skills should be taken into the nuclear construction 
Our Nuclear Future Delay or Demise?
42
because the project management was a major factor in the costs. 
With regard to the overall costs, it has been said that there is a target 
of 50% local content on the first nuclear plant. If there is a 50% local 
content, half the expenditure is spent in this country and will cause 
domestic growth. Infrastructure growth will mean increased electricity 
consumption. We should plan for this.
Prof Rob Adam: We have heard the eloquent and professional pre-
sentations during this symposium. This almost points to an ASSAf team 
that would move forward and try to make a consensus contribution to 
the field. We can begin by outlining the issues during this discussion. If 
the first two units cost R150 billion, 50% is R75 billion. The projects would 
have to be bonded at a level of about R30 billion. The market capital-
isation of the entire South African construction industry is about R50 bil-
lion. There is no way that shareholders would permit this. If government 
wants to go ahead with those levels of localisation they would have to 
address this issue. There needs to be an understanding between gov-
ernment and industry as to what the deal is before we can proceed 
otherwise there can be an expectation and a threshold given to ven-
dors, which is actually unattainable.
Dr Dawid Serfontein: I would like to explain some of the results I have 
on why the costs are so high in the West and this will explain why it 
is possible to bring the overnight costs down. The Three-Mile Island 
accident, followed a few years later by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
caught the world completely by surprise. Suddenly, in the midst of 
construction of new plants, regulations became much more stringent. 
This pushed up prices from about US$ 1 500/kW before the accidents 
to about US$ 6 000/kW a few years later and so the industry in the US 
collapsed. More recently, Olkiluoto was quoted for US$ 3 500/kW but 
the costs increased to about US$ 7 000/kW. If US$ 7 000/kW had been 
quoted from the start, it would have been an amazing achievement 
because it means that there had not been a substantial cost increase 
since the last plant built in the US to the first built in Europe, which is a 
next generation reactor. The same team that did the building in Europe 
is now working in China. They were over budget and behind schedule 
in Europe but they are below budget and ahead of schedule in China. 
Prof Anton Eberhard: Rosatom in Hungary is one of the most recent 
contracts that have been signed. The specific investment costs (unsure 
whether an overnight cost or a fully wrapped cost) is about US$ 7 030 
per installed kW. 
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Dr Dawid Serfontein: This is a similar case to the Hinkley Point plant. Either 
the plant is sold and a selling price is asked, or there is a contract using 
an overnight price as one of the determinants to work out what the 
contracted selling price of the power will be. The overnight cost should 
be viewed in the context of the whole contract. In the case of Rosatom 
a high capital cost and very low interest rate were used. In the end 
the production cost of the electricity is low, and that is all that matters. 
This means that one should not look at the capital costs, but at the full 
contracted power price that is being offered. In addition to Hinkley 
Point, the British also awarded contracted selling prices for wind and 
solar, and nuclear came out a bit cheaper than all the rest. 
Prof Anton Eberhard: Capital costs are relevant as they ultimately in-
form what the contract price would be. The issue is whether we are 
getting the accurate contract prices. 
Dr Grové Steyn: I want to make a comparative point on the question 
of the capital cost of these mega projects. If we were now at the 
point where decisions were being made about Medupi and Kusile, 
we would do the same thing and get the international comparative 
prices and try to find a benchmark of what it would cost to build the 
power stations. I am making the point that we cannot be building the 
most expensive coal-fired plants in the world. For the same reason 
that we have problems with those two plants, we are going to build 
the most expensive nuclear plants in the world if we go the route of 
a mega, complex project. This is unfortunately the history of all our 
power projects. On paper the economies of scale and the other 
details look good but in reality there is a huge premium on projects that 
allow incrementalism, flexibility, delays and so forth. In a competitive 
market, it is those projects that always have problems. If the problem 
of uncertainty is ignored then you will think that the larger-scale mega 
projects will be cheaper but in reality we cannot forecast the future 
and the large projects will often go wrong for reasons of complexity, 
construction costs and incorrect demand forecasts. The smaller, more 
modest and more incremental projects almost inevitably and in the 
real world end up a lot cheaper. This is the experience in Europe, Britain 
and the US. 
Prof Anton Eberhard: It is clear that there are divergent views and a 
range of data around costs for nuclear. The debate has helped clarify 
the kind of numbers we are talking about, whether specific investment 
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costs (overnight cost), or all in-costs. We need to be more precise in 
our debate. We are also clear that the range of prices from Europe is 
different from those in the East and the implications of those costs for 
our own environment need to be interrogated further. We have also 
heard about potential risks of managing the large projects over time. 
One of the obvious lessons is that the way in which these contracts are 
structured will be absolutely critical. The risks must be wrapped and the 
vendor, rather than the consumer, should bear construction and cost 
risks.
Discount rates and the cost of capital
Prof Anton Eberhard: Discount rates are employed by economic mod-
ellers to compare different technologies. Good sets of arguments have 
been heard around how they should be used from a risk-adjusted per-
spective. We understand clearly that a lower discount rate will give a 
different answer in respect of the favourability of nuclear. We have also 
heard that discount rates are helpful in the initial screening of different 
technologies but ultimately what counts is what is being paid for the 
actual cost of capital. This is an interesting debate in the South African 
context where we understand that we are in a fiscally and debt-con-
strained environment and it was unlikely that National Treasury would 
invest directly in a nuclear programme. The issue was whether Eskom 
would be able to raise debt on its balance sheet. Those who have con-
sidered this matter are of the view that it would be very unlikely in the 
next few years. The focus now is on what kind of funding vendors would 
bring to a potential nuclear programme. 
 
Mr Andrew Kenny: The cost of capital is critical. Construction delays 
and regulation delays will kill projects. Dr Steyn mentioned the reason 
why nuclear would not suffer from the same problems as Kusile and 
Medupi. Medupi and Kusile are both once-offs and one of a kind. Unit 
costs, the cost of capital and construction times will come down if a 
fleet of nuclear plants is built.
  
Prof Harald Winkler: We tend to use the discount rate in the context 
of national energy modelling and we do, as a matter of course, run 
sensitivities. I am really interested in the methodology presented by Dr 
Steyn, the focus on cash flow and integrating technology specific risks. 
Dr Serfontein’s robust critique of almost every other study including that 
of the ERC, is appreciated. It would be very interesting from the ERC’s 
Our Nuclear Future Delay or Demise?
45
point of view to make a process point and do further analytical work 
on how and when a discount rate applies and for what purpose from 
the public, private or any other perspective. It would be valuable to 
unpack this and all the acronyms that have been used.
Prof Anton Eberhard: The issue of capital cost and the actual cost of 
financing all ultimately translate into a contract price. If the model that 
would be followed for our nuclear will be a vendor offering a pack-
age, which is ring-fenced, turnkey, where risks that are wrapped, then 
the key issue would be the contract price. The issue of transparency 
around the contract will arise and whether it will be a fixed index price 
over time. This can be compared to other alternatives. 
Planning
Prof Anton Eberhard: Planning has framed our discussions. We started 
by looking at the IRP and its update and had inputs from Dr Steyn 
on the issues of incertitude, uncertainty and how more recent and 
modern approaches take account of flexibility in investment decisions. 
One of the advances in the IRP update is that it has started taking this 
approach where there are a number of scenarios instead of one fixed 
plan. How could our planning frameworks be improved and how would 
they assist investment decisions for nuclear?
Mr Tony Surridge: With regard to demand and supply, the large energy 
user will not invest until they have certainty of supply. Unless there is 
commitment to a plan, they will not invest. Supply and demand seem 
to be a catch 22. The decrease in demand could be due to the short-
age of supply. 
Prof Anton Eberhard: Although the IRP update has assumed lower 
electricity demand it has done this only for the historical period. It says 
that where we are today is lower than where we thought we would be 
and uses this as the starting point. Aggressive demand growth scenarios 
have been adopted, which are linked to the NDP growth aspirations. 
The IRP update does plan for future growth. 
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Prof Tomas Kåberger: The wrong summation is one that is traced in the 
European and American situation because you often have the large 
electricity consumers also being investors in production or actors who 
sign offtake agreements with the investors making financing much 
easier; a little uncertain prices where hedging and off-take agreements 
become more important for investors. The relationship between the 
producers and the consumers, already at the investment stage, has 
become stronger with the competitive electricity market. 
Prof Harald Winkler: Even if all the evidence that climate change is 
‘unequivocal’ is ignored, you cannot both deny that climate change is 
not real and argue that lower CO2 is an advantage for nuclear power. 
This is inconsistent. The general approach that applies to all energy 
planning whether or not nuclear is to move from a single long-term 
plan to a flexible plan that does have the long term in mind. This is an 
approach to decision-making under uncertainty (emphasised by Dr 
Steyn) and investigating both high and low costs and different discount 
rates. This is the kind of information that we need to apply to nuclear, as 
well as other technologies. 
Prof Philip Lloyd: Lessons can be learnt from how the Northern European 
market (not the German market) has had to adapt and one can come 
up with an efficient model that attracts diversity into the supply system 
and allows various sources of energy to be accommodated. South 
Africa is missing an independent efficient market operator and until 
there is change we are unlikely to make progress towards the modern 
system that has been found to be successful in much of Europe. In the 
debate about costs, it has been forgotten that the cost of unserved 
energy exceeds the cost of energy many, many fold. This means that 
whatever the planning, always aim for a little bit more than is needed. 
Never underestimate the demand. Recently we have faced consistent 
underestimation of the need.    
Prof Anton Eberhard: Prof Lloyd made these two excellent points: 
• Although we have been focusing on planning and investment 
decisions around particular technologies, this should take place 
within a broader electricity market structure. Achieving this would 
help make the planning, procurement and contracting processes 
much more sustainable.
• The lack of electricity over the last few years has been a very 
serious constraint on economic growth. 
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There is recognition of the importance of this debate and of making 
appropriate decisions around the electricity future of South Africa so 
that the economy can grow and the various goals and visions of the 
NDP can be achieved.  
Recap and Closure 
(Prof Daya Reddy, ASSAf)
The presentations have helped to set out the broad framework within 
which the nuclear energy of this country functions. A recurring theme 
of the symposium was that of the complexity of the terrain, particularly 
in the context of the shift in the IRP to the recognition of the need 
for a long-term strategy, rather than firm decisions on the future. Dr 
Steyn’s presentation on uncertainty analysis and all that it implied had 
consolidated this section of the proceedings. 
The discussion about cost, particularly in relation to the amount of 
time spent revisiting and reinforcing some of the complexities around 
cost of capital, discount rates and construction times has been most 
appropriate. Dr Serfontein’s presentation was experienced by some 
participants as counter-intuitive and a very helpful contribution to the 
debate.
Prof Kåberger’s presentation provided an opportunity to step back 
from the South African debate on nuclear and gain insight into an in-
ternational perspective. The message of his presentation was that of 
the coming of age of renewables, the extent to which renewable en-
ergy was a major component of the energy mix in many countries, 
particularly in Europe and China. China was adopting renewables ag-
gressively and at the same time it was in the process of building 28 new 
nuclear reactors. Much could be learnt from practices and experienc-
es of nuclear all over the world. South Africa should be willing to learn 
these lessons. 
ASSAf’s view that this should be a scholarly debate, one that was re-
inforced and underpinned by evidence, had been upheld with very 
few exceptions during the symposium. The presentations and the Q&A 
sessions were of a high quality and provided the platform to under-
stand some of the key issues, the analyses and their consequences and 
implications.    
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The outcomes of this symposium would include the production of a 
proceedings report and engagement with government to convey 
the usefulness of the symposium and ASSAf’s wish to interact with a 
view to adding value to the energy planning process, given what 
had emerged from the meeting. In addition, ASSAf would consider 
undertaking a consensus study on the topic of this symposium.
Prof Reddy thanked Prof Eberhard for his role in initiating the sequence 
of events that had led to the symposium and for chairing a session, 
Prof Diab and the ASSAf Secretariat for setting up the programme and 
organising the event, and Prof Adam for chairing the first session and 
for his substantial input into the organisation of the symposium. Prof 
Reddy commended the presenters, the panellists and the participants 
on the valuable quality of the presentations and the debate during the 
proceedings. 
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ANNEXURE B: 
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